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Abstract. Against the backdrop of organisational needs to derive value from IT 
Organisations through agility, efficiencies and cost effectiveness, many organi-
sations have adopted a decentralised IT organisational structure, enabling indi-
vidual business units the autonomy to implement, operate and govern technology. 
The increase risk that poses organisations through cyber-attacks, raises the ques-
tion of how IT security could effectively provide the level of organisations gov-
ernance to counter cyber threats in a decentralised organisational model. In ex-
ploring the challenges in the decentralization of IT security, we highlighted that 
the accountability of such activities would become diluted, with each business 
unit managing security in their own methods and practices or lack of, while una-
ble to take full accountability due to the complex independencies of modern sys-
tem architectures, often resulting in a lack of ownership, accountability and re-
porting of security at an organisational group level. This ultimately increases the 
overall security risk to the organization. We further highlighted that while cen-
tralization of IT security at a group level would be more effective, a hybrid model 
of IT security at two-levels with strategy and policy at the central governance 
level and a degree of autonomy and decision at the IT Operational level could 
also be considered. 
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1 Introduction 
 
As businesses compete with one another for the competitive edge and dominant market 
share, it has become evident that IT can play a crucial role in enabling firms to meet 
their strategic objectives [1].  Firms may have to increase their investments in Infor-
mation Technology (IT) to remain efficient, innovative, agile, and compete against their 
market competitors.  
As Pajic et al. [2] highlight the increasing use of information technology has resulted 
in firms needing to evaluate the productivity impact of IT investments through IT value 
measures [2]. However, IT value has been a continuous discussion for organisations. 
Lei & Huifan suggest that organisations are challenged to determine the overall organ-
isation performance generated by IT capabilities [3].   
2 
In today’s organisations, data is considered as a treasured asset, which with appro-
priate data analytics techniques, can enhance business decision makings [4].  Lowry [5]  
argues that modern business organisations increasingly depend on their IT departments, 
he further goes on to suggest that IT Organisations are not merely expected to provide 
supporting services but more so becoming strategic partners and providing value-added 
services, moreover aligning its objectives and priorities with those of the departments 
and organisations overall strategy [5].  
Lowry and Wilson's view relies on the assumption that IT performance will be opti-
mised to meet the businesses demands and needs. Often IT performance is criticised 
for the lack of service quality and agility to meet the requirements of the broader or-
ganisation [5],  as Whyte et al. suggest that IT organisation often failed to support busi-
nesses efficiently and in particular to change business attitudes and satisfy user needs 
[6].  
This can result in organisations moving towards outsourcing their IT Services to 
third party organisations or decentralisation of the internal IT organisation and its ca-
pabilities. Moreover, it is against the backdrop of organisations move towards decen-
tralisation of their IT capabilities and the increased risk of security breaches and the 
implications of them to an organisation’s reputations and revenue that this paper aims 
to review some of the critical considerations of a Centralised IT security capability. 
2 IT Security in IT Organisations 
As the growth of online channels such as e-commerce and mobile commerce continues 
to increase and become a key revenue generator and strategic objective for most organ-
isations, the need for robust IT Security governance has also become apparent. While 
previously IT security was often seen as a reactive measure, afterthought or over-head 
cost, the growing pressures to keep data and systems safe from customers, stakeholders 
and government regulators has forced organisations to elevate proactive and robust se-
curity measures [7], which includes people, technology and process considerations [8]. 
According to Hooper & Mckissack [9], in the past ten years, cybersecurity breaches 
have cost organisations worldwide billions of dollars. Most notably, technology firms 
such as eBay, Adobe Systems, AOL and Sony Interactive Entertainment’s PlayStation 
Network have suffered heavy losses, resulting in widespread media reporting and 
served to attract organisation and public awareness of the potential damages of security 
breaches [9].  For this paper, security is defined as the protection against undesirable 
disclosure, destruction, or modification of data in a system and also the protection of 
systems themselves [10]. There are three key elements which underpin this definition, 
and these are vulnerabilities, exploits and threats.  
• Vulnerabilities - these are bugs, weaknesses or flaws found in the design 
of the system architecture or processes which allow attackers to comprise 
these vulnerabilities to execute nefarious activities such as un-authorised 
access to data, Phishing or denial of service attacks (DDoS) [11], 
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• Exploits -  these are actions which are executed by attackers on the identi-
fied vulnerabilities using various tools and techniques, often for purposes 
of self-satisfaction or financial gain [10] [11], 
• Threats – these refer to the impending risk of an exploit that may be exe-
cuted on identified vulnerabilities. Threats enable organisations to put in 
place countermeasures to mitigate and nullify the vulnerabilities and po-
tential attack. 
Whilst the importance of IT Security for an organisation is apparent [8] [9] [10], 
Organisations have in recent years been faced with the dilemma of centralising or de-
centralising their IT capabilities. 
Brynjolfson, in his paper titled 'information assets, technology and organisation' [12] 
explained how information technology had the potential to significantly affect the struc-
ture of organisations. Almost 26 years on there remains a debate on how best to formu-
late the IT Organization within the context of the wider organisation. A continued 
'merry-go-round' has witnessed the early popularity of centralisation to decentralisation 
in the 1980s and then re-centralisation of the 1990’s [13]. In recent years with the grow-
ing disruptive digital phenomena and organisation drivers to promote innovation and 
agility [14], businesses are again seeking to ask the question whether to centralise or 
decentralise their IT organisations. 
King [15] makes the basic assumption that centralised IT benefits the organisation 
by economies of scale while decentralised IT benefits by economies of scope [15]. Cen-
tralisation of IT versus decentralisation of IT refers predominantly to three key aspects. 
Firstly, the control of autonomy of decisions making in the organisation. Centralised 
organisations largely concentrate the decision into a single business unit, person or a 
group of individuals, while decentralisation primarily means devolving the decision-
making authority and autonomy to individual departments and business units. This is 
supported by Richardson et al. [16] report from a 1987 study by  Przestrzelski  suggest-
ing decentralisation can be broadly defined as "a dynamic, participative philosophy of 
organisational management that involves selective delegation of authority to the oper-
ational level" [16]. 
In the context of IT Security, individual business units would now have the freedom 
to make their own security-related decisions, such as the procurement and delivery of 
software, hardware, security governance and processes, controlled use of administra-
tive privileges, and vulnerability assessment and remediation activities. Secondly, the 
physical location of resources. Centralisation often has resources in one place, while 
decentralisation spreads resources across multiple locations within the organisation. 
Thirdly, capabilities and functional activities. In centralisation, control and governance 
of functional capabilities would be driven from a central competency centre, while in 
decentralisation the functional capabilities would be disseminated across single or mul-
tiple business units.  
In traditional organisations IT security has often fallen under the CIO organisation 
providing centralised security governance, and compliance, Hooper & Mckissack [9] 
argue that while this arrangement made sense, the downside resulted in IT security often 
being diluted in the plethora of other capabilities that IT was responsible for, not only 
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in relation to priority but also budget allocation, with IT security often fading into the 
background unless there are had been a major security breach [9]. Whilst the authors 
do not advocate the decentralisation of IT security to individual business units within 
an organisation, they do however pose the question of where best fits a central IT secu-
rity capability within an organisation. The authors highlight that while placing a central 
IT security function under the CIO could have benefits of synergies between both func-
tions and efficiencies resulting in greater value for the organisation, this could also re-
sult in inhibitors for the security capability to highlight security threats, vulnerabilities 
and exploits of the CIO function. Whilst, separating the two functions out also comes 
with the challenge of diluted accountability as much of the security governance and 
principle are reliant on the underpinning IT systems and processes. 
3 Centralisation and Decentrlisation of IT Security 
 
For most organisation, the risk of IT security breaches remains high, ensuring business 
continuity, threat avoidance, quick incident resolution and disaster recovery. In a de-
centralised model, the accountability of such activities becomes diluted with each busi-
ness unit managing security in their own methods and practises or lack of, while unable 
to take full accountability due to the complex independencies of modern system archi-
tectures, often resulting in a lack of ownership, accountability and reporting of security 
at an organisational group level. King [15] explores aspects of both centralising and 
decentralising. He suggests that centralisation of control preserves top management 
prerogatives, capitalising on economies of scale and to preserve organisational integrity 
in operations. The economies of scale arise from exploiting the full potential of tech-
nologies that cause the output to increase more rapidly than costs. The costs of dupli-
cating overhead and facilities can be avoided, and organisational protocols are easier to 
enforce, while decentralisation allows lower-level managers discretion and authority in 
decision making, while also fostering a culture of innovation of new opportunities and 
responsibility for their decision making, possibly improving their performance. How-
ever, decentralisation of control may lead to problems of accountability and decision 
making if lower-level managers lack key competencies and are not held accountable 
for decisions [15]. King’s point on key competencies and accountability is particularly 
pertinent to IT Security. Khallaf & Majdalawieh examined whether the CIO's compe-
tency is a determinant of IT security performance measurement. The study highlights 
that CIOs' knowledge in IT acquired through their education or work experience im-
proves the performance of IT security [17]. The study reaffirms King’s [15] viewpoint 
that by decentralising capabilities there may be a loss of key skills and competencies, 
with IT security itself being a complex domain which requires experience, knowledge 
with security architectures, processes and governance professionally designed [18]. To 
explore this view further, we explore some of the most common attacks cybersecurity 
vulnerabilities that organisations face today and how they would be complicated in a 
decentralised security landscape. Several studies have attempted to classify, character-
ise and provide recommendations to tackle cyber and cyber-enabled threats and security 
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implications e.g. [19] [20]. A study by Humayun [10] Identified and analysed common 
cybersecurity vulnerabilities. The findings highlighted that Denial of service (DoS) was 
the most commonly addressed vulnerability (37%). The second most common vulner-
ability was Malware (21%), and finally, the third most common was Phishing (9%) 
[10]. We can see from the authors' research that all three vulnerabilities constituted to 
67% of cybersecurity threats that organisations encounter today. In order to understand 
this better, we describe some of their key characteristics. 
3.1 Malware  
Malware is a shorthand term used for malicious software. In this attack, software pro-
grams are deployed on to user computers or servers to gain unauthorised access. The 
intent behind these types of attacks is to compromise organisational network devices in 
order to gain control of the host systems and networks for malicious aims [10].  A 
variety of malware types exists such as Viruses, Trojan Horses, Worms, Ransomware 
and Spyware. One of the most recent trends, Ransomware, a type of Malware has over 
the last five years gained prominence [21]. Ransomware is where a victim of an attack 
is blackmailed. According to Cartwright and Cartwright [21]  there approximately hun-
dreds, if not thousands, of ransomware strands in the wild [21]. 
Two such examples of Ransomware have been the cyber-attack that affected more 
than sixty NHS trusts in the United Kingdom, with 200,000 computers affected glob-
ally. The impact of this resulted in many facilities unable to access patient records 
which led to delays in surgeries and cancelled patient appointments [22]. The second 
of the attacks was that of South Korean web-hosting firm Nayana paying a $1 million 
ransom in 2017 clearly demonstrates how lucrative Ransomware can be for attackers 
[21].  
3.2 Denial of Service (DOS) 
Denial of service attacks have been around for many years, and they are triggered by a 
flood of network requests to an organisation's servers and networks, ultimately bringing 
the infrastructure down and enabling attackers to access vulnerabilities during the in-
frastructures recovery phase for bringing services back up. Large organisations have 
not been immune from DOS attacks, Yahoo, Amazon.com, eBay, CNN.com, Buy.com, 
ZDNet, were all subjected to total or regional outages of several hours caused by dis-
tributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks [23].  
3.3 Phishing  
Phishing is one of the most common forms of cyber-attack. Phishing works by attackers 
deceiving people with socially engineered approaches of downloading Malware or sur-
rendering sensitive data such as passwords, personal information or bank details.  
Curtis et al. [24] highlight that whilst technologies have evolved with organisations 
deploying tools such spam filters to effectively detect and deter known phishing cam-
paigns, attackers continuously find new ways to evade these technologies such as 
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through sophisticated and personalised e-mails ("spear-phishing") that take advantage 
of human limitations and biases and persuade people to respond [24]. 
Considering the impact that the previously described vulnerabilities can cause to or-
ganisations, rather than decentralise IT security processes, governance and capabilities, 
it is apparent that organisations should strategically align their IT Security and Business 
in way that it meets business needs, goals and strategies [25]. In the case of the NHS 
malware attack, it was identified that due to a lack of centralised security investment 
that many of the Windows operating systems were more than 15 years old and were no 
longer updated or supported by Microsoft [22]. 
Kearns and Lederer (2000) highlight the while IT Investment plans are often planned 
in isolation it is the utmost importance that IT and business investment plans are aligned 
on the strategic objectives of the organisation in order to obtain effectiveness  (Kearns 
and Lederer, 2000). Furthermore, El Mekawy et al. [25] suggest that Information secu-
rity processes (ISP) are an integrated part of IT strategy and business operations [25].  
4 Information Security Processes 
Centralised Information security can enable organisations to implement security risk- 
assessment processes.  According to Laliberte [26], conducting risk-assessments are 
not only a good idea but can help organisations determine where organisations should 
invest their efforts both financially and effort to reduce its security exposure [26]. 
Laliberte [26] further argues that more importantly, risk assessments help to identify 
the key assets they need to protect and the threats and vulnerabilities those assets face. 
By assessing the likelihood of an incident and the effect of the incident actually occur-
ring, the organisation can make a more informed decision about how and to what extent 
it should proceed to protect that asset. In essence, the risk assessment covers six key 
phases: 
1. Asset identification; 
2. Threat assessment; 
3. Vulnerability assessment; 
4. Risk determination; 
5. Identification of countermeasures; 
6. and finally, Remediation planning. 
Oppliger [18]goes further to posit that the output of the security risk assessment goes 
further than just remediation planning, It forms the basis of the security policy, strategy 
and architecture at a technical, organisational and legal level [18]. 
Whilst Security risk assessments make sense, a study by Hooper & McKissack [9] 
found that the use of formal assurance techniques based on risk and security metrics at 
a central level did not always provide effective insights and communications tools to 
senior executives [9]. The survey resulted in these key findings: 
• 75% of respondents indicated that metrics were important or very im-
portant to a risk-based security program. 
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• 53% didn't believe or were unsure whether the security metrics used in 
their organisations were properly aligned with business objectives. 
• 51% per cent didn't believe or were unsure whether organisations metrics 
adequately conveyed the effectiveness of security risk management efforts 
to senior executives. 
With these challenges already existing at a centralised IT security model, it would 
only be compounded by decentralising IT security in how to formulate, capture, meas-
ure, consolidate and action the overall security posture of an organisation, resulting in 
an increased risk of security breaches.   
Lowry & Wilson [5] posits that centralised organisations that meet or exceed the 
service qualities of their business partners, the organisation, in turn, is far greater to 
derive IT related benefits. Conversely, if IT quality is low the organisation's ability to 
innovate and respond to market conditions will be hindered, leading the business to 
alternative IT models such as decentralisation. Magnusson [13] further support this no-
tion from research on a case study of a large Swedish organisation, where he notes that 
a level of IT Support quality had resulted in some departments having to abdicate from 
IT altogether, decreasing their usage and even matters of organisation compliance [13]. 
While the literature supports that there is a relationship between IT perception of Ser-
vice quality, there is a contradictory element, whereby although acknowledging the lack 
of IT service quality, some organisations may refrain from outwardly recommending 
decentralising. This may be down to a market context, whereby the concern of the avail-
able skills in less developed economies may act as an inhibitor to decentralise the IT 
organisation or that there is a lack of agreement on the key organisational objectives 
that drive the centralisation/decentralisation of IT 
King [15] sets out organisational measurements/objectives of IT that drive the dis-
cussion on centralisation and decentralisation. This study adapts Kings models to in-
corporate Security aspects for an organisation: 
• The need to provide IT security capability to all organisational units that 
legitimately require it. 
• The need to contain the capital and operations costs in the provision of 
computing services within the organisation. 
• The need to satisfy special computing needs of user departments 
• The need to maintain organisational integrity in operations that are de-
pendent on computing, i.e., avoid mismatches in operations among depart-
ments. 
• The need to meet information requirements of management and security 
of the data. 
• The need to provide computing services in a reliable, secure, professional, 
and technically competent manner. 
• The need to allow organisational units sufficient autonomy in the conduct 
of their tasks to optimise creativity and performance at the unit level, 
while not putting the organisation at a risk of security breaches 
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• The need to preserve autonomy among organisational units, and if possi-
ble, to increase their importance and influence within the larger organisa-
tion, however, key capabilities with the required high level of governance 
such as IT Security remain centrally governed. 
• The need, wherever possible, to make the work of employees enjoyable as 
well as productive.  
• The need to counter security threats, vulnerabilities and exploits. 
5 Conclusion 
In summary, whilst a complete decentralising of IT Security capabilities across the or-
ganisation would create lack of governance, diluting accountability, increasing cost and 
skills while increasing the risk of IT security breaches there are rational arguments for 
both centralisation and decentralisation of the IT security function.  Magnusson [13] 
highlights that centralisation and decentralisation may not be 'opposites or alternatives' 
but as mutually dependent. The model that Magnusson refers to the hybridisation of IT 
at two-levels with strategy and policy at the central governance level and a degree of 
autonomy and decision at the departmental/business unit level. This model also sup-
ports findings of Richardson et al.  [16] that high performing organisations included 
those with simultaneous decentralisation and centralisation at two levels of the organi-
sation [16]. Furthermore, in relation to IT Security, Hooper & Mckissack [9] support 
the notion of a hybrid configuration, with an introduction of a CISO (Chief Security 
officer) reporting to the CEO.  
The configuration would be a split between operations and the more strategic level. 
For example, the IT department would be in charge of the day-to-day technical security 
operations while the CISO would operate independently and be responsible for the stra-
tegic aspects of the organisation’s security posture.  In conclusion, the impacts of IT 
security breaches for organisations are both vast in terms of financial and reputational 
damage. Organisations should keep consistency through centralisation of IT Security 
with two options 1) Complete centralisation of IT security at an IT level; or 2) a hybrid 
configuration with a CISO reporting to the CEO as a strategic security capacity and IT 
performing the day-to-day security operations underpinned by the Strategy of a CISO. 
Rather, Organisations should refrain from devolving IT Security responsibilities in a 
decentralised manner to individual business units which will only lead to dilution of 
responsibility, accountability of security capabilities and governance across the organ-
isation increasing the risk of security breaches and attacks. 
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